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2Abstract
This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a
poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of
executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship
between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of
the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in
banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or
acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully
protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for
those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives
voice to several stakeholder groups.
JEL classification: G21, G34 and G38
Keywords: Corporate governance, commercial and savings banks, executive turnover,
mergers and acquisitions
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1. Introduction
This paper presents empirical evidence on how effective internal governance
mechanisms are at the time of disciplining non-performing managers and directors of
Spanish Commercial Banks and Savings Banks. In Spain, Commercial Banks are
shareholder-oriented corporations while Savings Banks are non-profit institutions where
control is shared among multiple interest groups. Our paper provides evidence on how
corporate governance works in those two different institutional regimes that compete
with each other.
As Prowse (1997) indicates, research on corporate governance applied to financial
intermediaries has been scarce. This research topic is particularly relevant because
financial intermediaries are subject to a severe regulation that limits the effectiveness of
external control mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control or competition in
the product market. Consequently, corporate governance issues have to be addressed
either by internal control mechanisms, such as the disciplinary role of the board of
directors and the general assembly of shareholders, or by the regulatory authorities.
There are several ways to evaluate how effective each control mechanism is. In this
paper, we assume that internal control works properly if the probability of a significant
board turnover, including the replacement of the chairman or the general manager of the
bank, increases with bad economic performance1. We also view the friendly merger of
banks as an intermediate control mechanism, something in between the internal
mechanisms and the external ones. A merger needs to be approved by the different
bank’s governance bodies, but a merger also implies that a bank’s assets are transferred
to the acquiring company. For this scenario, we assume that good governance will
                                                     
1 Other ways of evaluating the quality of governance take into account the size and the composition of the board of
directors, the separation between the CEO and the chairman seats in the board, the compensation schemes, etc.
4predict that the likelihood that a bank merges and transfers its assets to another bank
increases with a poor economic performance on the side of the acquired bank.
The “Cajas de Ahorros” (Savings Banks) control about half of the Spanish retail
banking and compete among themselves, as long as with Commercial Banks for loans
and deposits. As a distinctive feature, though, their profits must be either retained in the
bank or invested in social and cultural programs. They can be viewed then as
“commercial non-profit” firms in the sense of Hansmann (1996), and they pay, on
average, 25 per cent of their profits to social programs while retaining the remaining
profits for the organic growth of the institution. There is no market for corporate control
of Savings Banks and both, the general assembly and the board, are composed by
representatives of four stakeholders groups: public authorities, depositors, employees
and founding entities. Compared with Commercial Banks, Spanish Savings Banks
display several important institutional differences: they are not-for-profit organizations,
they are totally isolated from the market for corporate control and, quite importantly,
they must respond to the possible conflicts of interests among the various stakeholders
with “voice” inside the governance mechanisms. This paper examines how such
differences translate into economic performance, and it also provides evidence on the
relationship between management turnover and mergers on one side and economic
performance on the other.
Section 2 presents an overview of the general issues raised about governance in banking
firms along with a description of the methodology used in the paper to evaluate how
different governance mechanisms work for the case of Spanish financial intermediaries.
Since governance mechanisms are expected to work differently depending on the
ownership form, we formulate some hypothesis concerning the differences one can
anticipate in section 3. The results of the empirical analysis on the relationship between
governance interventions and the economic performance of banks are reported in
sections 4 and 5. Finally, we summarize the main findings of the paper and derive some
policy implications from them.
2. The corporate governance of banks
As it happens in the case of commercial firms in general, the corporate governance of
banks refers to the various methods by which bank owners attempt to induce managers
5to implement value-maximizing policies2. These methods may be external to the firm,
as the market for corporate control or the level of competition in the product and labor
markets. But there are also internal mechanisms such as a disciplinary intervention by
shareholders (proxy fights) or intervention from the board of directors. Finally, we
consider the case of a friendly merger as an intermediate mechanism between the
internal and the external ones. 
Prowse (1997) notices that the specific regulation of banks reduces the effectiveness of
external control mechanisms, making then the internal devices much more relevant. As
a result, many of the lessons learnt from non-financial firms (based mainly in the use of
external mechanisms) cannot just be extended to financial institutions.
When a bank comes under the threat of a takeover, the regulator must give its approval.
This process takes longer time than the market approach and, furthermore, the
regulator’s decision will be based on minimizing the probability of bank failure, which
is not the same objective as maximizing shareholder value. Competition in the product
markets is another external device that helps to discipline managers. When revenues go
down, managers in a non-competitive market might respond by increasing prices to
compensate those lower revenues. In the presence of competitors, this is no longer an
option. If a bank increased its prices, competitors would take advantage of the situation
and steal market share from that firm, adding pressure on the bank’s manager to adopt
better decisions and not shirk on effort. Once again, the legal environment of the
banking industry makes this competition mechanism not so efficient in comparison to
the non-financial sector, and it can be better characterized by the presence of
oligopolies. 
The ownership structure and, more specifically, the role of large shareholders must be
addressed too. Large banks present a very dispersed ownership structure when we
compare them to non-banking firms. For example, in the US, and due to the Glass-
Steagall Act, there was not possible for large corporations before the year 2000 to
become shareholders of American banks. Although this was not the case in continental
Europe, where some large companies have become shareholders of banks, their
shareholdings are also far from relevant levels, due in part to the regulator’s concerns. 
                                                     
2 For recent surveys on general corporate governance issues see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Tirole (2001)
6For the case of Spain, there are at least four different ownership structures we can
consider: Independent Commercial Banks, Subsidiaries of Independent Spanish Banks,
Subsidiaries of Foreign Commercial Banks and, finally, Savings Banks. The first three
types fall into the category of shareholder-oriented banks, although the ownership
structure is much more dispersed among the Independent Banks. Subsidiaries, on the
other hand, are typically one-hundred-percent owned by parent banks. Therefore, the
agency problems are more likely to be observed in the case of Independent Banks than
in their subsidiaries. For the remaining of the paper, we will treat national and foreign
subsidiaries as a single category, as we could not find significant differences between
the two in the empirical analysis we conducted.
Savings Banks are a very relevant institution within the Spanish banking system. Most
of them were founded in the second half of the XIX century as a way of promoting
popular savings. At that time, small savers distrusted private banks due to serious moral
hazard problems and the lack of deposit insurance and banking regulations. The Spanish
government itself lacked the necessary reputation to launch a government-backed bank
as it happened in France, Portugal or other European countries in order to enhance
popular savings. In fact, the government founded such a bank in the 1850’s but it
quickly ended up in a bankruptcy process. The first Spanish Savings Banks were
created around the “Monte de Piedad”, a thrifty institution with a solid reputation
among small savers, and for several decades both institutions worked together on a
complementary basis until the success of the Savings Banks on attracting resources
clearly exceeded the capacity of the thrifty to use them. 
Today, Savings Banks control about half of the Spanish retail banking and their market
shares have been steadily increasing in the last decade. Savings Banks compete with
each other and with Commercial Banks, and their profits are either retained or employed
to provide funding to social programs. Their ownership form is a private foundation,
with a board of trustees where representatives from regional authorities, city halls,
workers, depositors and the founding entity seat. Figure 1 shows the composition of the
general assembly (and of the board of directors) of a typical Spanish Savings Bank.
7Table 1: Assembly composition for a typical Spanish Savings Bank
Founders 
35% 
Depositors
36.9% 
Employees
12.5% 
Local / Regional 
Administration 
15.6% 
Assembly 
160 seats 
Savings Banks can be considered as stakeholder-oriented organizations, while
Commercial Banks are shareholder-oriented companies. Those represented in the boards
of Savings Banks act more as trustees than as owners of the assets, while bank
shareholders have well-defined property rights over the bank’s assets. These differences
make people to believe that the economic performance of Savings Banks should be
worse than that of Commercial Banks, since more clear and well defined property rights
should imply more pressure on the managerial team to increase profits. However, the
empirical evidence shows that Savings Banks and Commercial Banks have similar
efficiency levels, Pastor (1995), Grifell and Lovell (1997) and Lozano (1998),
contradicting the previous hypothesis. One possible conclusion for this evidence might
be that, after all, ownership and governance are not so decisive for a firm’s economic
performance when that firm is subject to sufficient product market competition, as it is
the case in the Spanish retail banking. Nevertheless, before drawing any conclusion we
should first provide evidence on how governance mechanisms work for the two types of
banks.
3. Methodology and Hypothesis
As it was indicated above, we are interested in testing the effectiveness of those
governance mechanisms different from the market for corporate control (hostile
takeovers) on Spanish banks. The underlying general assumption is that governance
becomes more effective if we observe that the likelihood of a top manager turnover
and/or executive directors turnover increase with a poor economic performance of the
bank. The effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms has been evaluated in this
way before for samples of non-financial firms in different countries: Warner et al (1988)
8for the US, Kaplan (1994) for Germany, Kaplan and Minton (1994) for Japan, Franks et
al (2001) for the UK, or Gispert (1998) for the Spanish case. All these papers confirm
an inverse relation between absolute measures of economic performance, such as ROA,
ROE or shareholder market returns, and the likelihood of changes in the position of
CEO and/or general manager of the firm.
Several authors have also applied this methodology for the case of banking firms. For
example, Barro and Barro (1990) use logit regressions to explain the probability of CEO
departure as a function of stock returns of the bank for a sample of large US commercial
banks over the period 1982-1987 after adjusting the data for peer-group returns.
Anderson and Campbell (2000), on the other hand, propose the lack of sensitiveness
between executive turnover and the performance of the Japanese banks as an evidence
of the banking sector’s inefficiencies in that country. Prowse (1995) evaluates the
governance of US banks by examining the relationship between the probability that
each one of four control mechanisms (management turnover, hostile takeovers, friendly
mergers and regulatory intervention) was activated in relation with the economic
performance of the banks. Furthermore, Prowse looks at the frequency of these
mechanisms for the case of banking firms, and compare them with the rates observed in
the non-banking sectors. He finds then that control mechanisms are activated less
frequently in the banking sector than in other economic sectors. Moreover, there appears
to be some substitution between regulation and other governance mechanisms for the
case of banks.
In this paper we are interested in providing some comparative empirical evidence from
a country, Spain, that enjoys a different legal and institutional structure with respect to
Japan or the US. Furthermore, we compare how governance can work on correcting bad
economic performance among banks with different ownership structures and goals, such
as the case of Independent Banks versus Subsidiaries, or Commercial Banks versus
Savings Banks.
Subsidiaries of other banks, either national or foreign, are likely to be subject to closer
supervision by their “principal” than independent banks. In the first case, the parent
company has full control over this subsidiary and it will likely perform the internal
supervision of activities that limit the discretion of managers of a subsidiary to act
against the principal’s interest. In more formal terms, subsidiaries are likely to operate
9under a “behavioral control” mechanism, while independent banks, where shareholders
are dispersed and lack the appropriate incentives to directly supervise the activity of the
managers, are more likely to use “performance based control” to align the interests of
managers and shareholders3. If this was the case we should observe for the sample of
Independent Banks a stronger relation between the activation of mechanisms, such as
management turnover and merger activity, and bad economic performance, in
comparison with what happens in the sample of subsidiaries.
H1. For Independent Banks, the relationship between the likelihood of control
intervention and bad performance becomes stronger than for the sample of
subsidiaries.
The multiple stakeholder orientation of Savings Banks along with the nature of each one
of the interest groups represented in the governance bodies (general assembly, board of
directors and committees) create the conditions for a weak internal system of corporate
governance. For example, the representatives of depositors are randomly selected from
the total population, and they are renewed every four years. The representatives of the
public authorities are most often political representatives from the different political
parties. Finally, many of the founding institutions are public. All these features suggest
that managers and workers may have a dominant role in the bank, although subject to
the law, the competition of other banks and the supervision by the Central Bank.
If governance bodies, such as the general assembly and the board of directors, have a
hard time to discipline bad performing managers because the later have more effective
power, then bad performance, when it occurs, will have to be addressed in a different
manner. We postulate that in the case of Savings Banks this alternative mechanism will
be mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, we expect mergers to be more relevant as a
governance mechanism for Savings Banks than for Commercial Banks.
H2. a) The relationship between management turnover and performance is
weaker for Savings Banks than  among Commercial Banks.
                                                     
3 Performance based control is more likely when supervision costs are high, as it is the case when share ownership is
rather dispersed. Behavioral control can be applied in subsidiaries of other banks because the parent company
becomes the only shareholder and enjoys hierarchical power over the subsidiary managers.
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b) Among Savings Banks, mergers are the main governance mechanism to
correct for a poor economic performance.
4. Empirical analysis
We have collected data for all banking institutions operating in Spain during the period
1986 through the year 2000. The Spanish Association of Private Banks (AEB) provided
the data for Commercial Banks, while the data concerning Savings Banks came from
the Spanish Federation of Savings Banks (CECA). For the case of Commercial Banks,
subsidiaries of foreign banks are well identified by the organizations that collect the
data, while additional work was done to distinguish between the groups of independent
banks and subsidiaries of domestic banks. We have a total of 1894 bank/year
observations4 for the time period covering 1986 through 2000. This means that the
number of banks in a representative year is 135.
For each bank we collected data concerning the interventions of governance
mechanisms, ownership type, size and economic performance. Four governance
interventions are considered in our study: (i) a turnover of at least fifty per cent of
executive directors apart form the chairman of the board and the CEO (or general
manager); (ii) the removal of the chairman of the board; (iii) the removal of the CEO of
the bank; and (iv) a merger or an acquisition by another bank during a particular year.
For the four scenarios, the variables are recorded as a zero-nonzero value, with the value
of zero meaning no intervention has occurred and a positive value otherwise. The final
values depends on the type of intervention5.
According to their ownership type, we classify the banks in the sample into three
groups: Independent Commercial Banks, Dependent Banks and Savings Banks. The
first group contains banks under shareholder control, most of them quoted in the
Spanish Stock Market and therefore with a high dispersion in terms of ownership.
                                                     
4 The figure of 1894 observations corresponds to 14 years instead of 15 because some variables are calculated as
differences (e.g., turnovers) and others have been lagged one year (e.g., performance).
5 From the whole data sample, we identify first the bank-year observations for which a merger or acquisition occurs.
Then we assign the value 4 to these cases. With the remaining data, we proceed to search for the bank-year
observations that have changed the CEO. A value 3 is then assigned to them. Next, we check for those bank-year
observations that have replaced the chairman of the board, and we assign a value 2 to them. Then we search in the
remaining observations for those cases where at least a 50% of the board members have changed from the previous
year. The” board change” variable takes here the value 1. The remaining bank-year observations correspond to non-
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Dependent Banks are subsidiaries of other banks, either Spanish or foreign. All their
shares are owned by their parent companies, and therefore they can be considered as
divisions of a larger firm. Finally, Savings Banks are stakeholder-oriented
organizations, as it was indicated earlier.
Size is introduced as a control variable in our study, since it is often correlated with
other unobserved variables such as asset diversification, managerial abilities and so on.
This variable is measured by the amount of bank total assets at the end of the year
previous to a governance intervention.
Concerning economic performance, this variable is measured in terms of accounting
profits divided by total assets of the bank. We favor return on assets (ROA) over return
on equity (ROE) because the later is affected by the capital asset ratio of the bank,
which differs substantially among the banks in the sample. Two measures of accounting
profits are also used: total net profit after taxes and profits from regular banking
operations before taxes. As it is well known, see Saurina (1997), Spanish banks tend to
smooth accounting profits by buying and selling assets such as shares of firms in which
they have previously invested. Profits from banking operations are less affected by the
capital gains (or losses and provisions) of financial and other investments than the
variable total net profits and, in this sense, we think it may be a better indicator of the
economic efficiency of the banks. Both variables are referred to the year before the
governance intervention takes place. The variable ROAt-1 will indicate then total net
profits over total assets in year t-1, and IOAt-1 will indicate the amount of profits from
banking operations over total assets, also referred to year t-1. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample of banks and the
variables used in the empirical analysis. Separate columns are also reported for
Independent Commercial Banks and for Savings Banks. Spanish financial
intermediaries manage, on average, 3.5 billion of Euros in assets and achieve a 1.393
percent return on those assets. Of these, 0.907 points come form regular banking
operations and the rest from financial investments and extraordinary profits. Banks
change at least fifty per cent of their executive directors every five years (that is, board
                                                                                                                                                           
intervention cases, and have a 0 value in our measure of governance interventions. The values assigned to every
governance intervention only reflect different categories, and the ordinal value has no further meaning.
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changes occur on 19.6 percent of the cases). The average time in office for a chairman
of the board is less than 7 years (chairman removal of 15.9 per cent), which is longer
than the CEO’s time in office, 4.4 years (and a 22.9 per cent of removal). Finally,
mergers and acquisitions only amount to 4.2 per cent of the interventions in our sample.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the relevant variables. 
 Whole sample Independent Commercial
Banks Savings Banks
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev.
Total Assets (109) € 2105 3.523 10.200 402 9.299 19.700 859 3.453*** 7.187
ROA(t-1) x 100 1792 1.393 3.040 355 1.127 2.475 727 1.283* 0.985
IOA(t-1) x 100 1792 0.907 2.291 355 0.590 1.738 727 0.915*** 0.612
Board change 1911 0.196 0.228 371 0.145 0.197 766 0.208*** 0.236
Chairman removal 1894 0.159 0.366 371 0.092 0.289 766 0.164*** 0.371
CEO removal 1615 0.229 0.420 371 0.264 0.441 487 0.131*** 0.338
Merger/Acquisition 2105 0.042 0.201 402 0.032 0.009 859 0.0547** 0.008
Significance level: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
The significance levels reported here refer to the differences between Independent Commercial
Banks and Savings Banks.
Spanish Banks are smaller than banks used in similar samples referring to Japan,
Anderson and Campbell (2000), and USA, Prowse (1995), and they earn higher return
on their investment. As table 2 indicates, board membership changes are more frequent
in Spanish banks than in US banks, and similar to the observed figures for Japan. The
average time in office for a CEO is lower in Spain than in the samples used in other
countries (that is, more frequent changes of CEOs in Spain), while mergers and
acquisitions of banks are less frequent in our sample than in other studies6.
                                                     
6 Obviously, this is a very rough comparison and it is important to mention, that the number of years differ among
them and do no match year by year.
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Table 2. Mechanisms of control. Governance intervention ratios.
Related studies CEO turnover Executiveturnover
Merger/
Acquisition
Anderson and Campbell (2000)
111 Japanese banks
1878 bank/years, 1977-1996
17.8% 20.3% -
Barro and Barro (1990)
83 US banks, 467 CEO years, 1982-87 12.8% - -
Prowse( 1995)
234 US bank holdings, 1987-1992 - 10.2% 12.4%
Our data
1894 Spanish bank/years, 1986-2000 22.9% 19.6% 4.2%
When compared with Independent Commercial Banks, we see that Spanish Savings
Banks are smaller in size but more profitable, especially when we consider only profits
from regular banking operations. This evidence is consistent with the results of other
studies, already mentioned above, and it shows that the ownership structure of Savings
Banks does not seem to affect negatively their economic performance. Board changes
and chairman removal are more frequent among Savings Banks than among
Independent Commercial banks, but the opposite is true for CEO removal and
merger/acquisitions, less frequent for the case of Savings Banks. Therefore
interventions are evenly distributed in the sample and the next question is to see how
such interventions relate to the economic performance of banks.
5. Governance intervention and economic performance
Some preliminary evidence is shown in table 3, where the economic performance of
banks with some governance intervention and banks with no intervention are compared.
For both the Dependent and Independent Commercial Banks cases more evidence is
formed in favor of the hypothesis that intervention is triggered by low performance,
This is more evident when measured by the IOA variable (returns from regular banking
operations). Concerning Savings Banks, no difference is detected between the two
subsamples.
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Table 3. Average ROA and IOA by bank type and governance intervention.
ROA(t-1) x 100 IOA(t-1) x 100
Non-intervention Governanceintervention Non-intervention
Governance
intervention
Dependent banks 1.787 1.385 1.204 0.869*
Independent
Commercial Banks 1.211 0.964 0.808 0.169***
Savings Banks 1.249 1.351 0.929 0.915
Governance intervention means here that a bank has experienced a CEO or Chairman
removal, or board turnover or a Merger/Acquisition.
 Significance level: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
The reported significance levels refer to the differences between governance
intervention and non-intervention.
A multivariate analysis will indicate which kind of governance mechanism is more
likely to be activated in the case of low performance and, furthermore, if the likelihood
is homogeneous or not among different ownership types. The model to be estimated is a
multinomial logit model where the dependent variable considers five different
situations: no intervention, board change, replacement of the chairman, CEO removal
and merger or acquisition. As explanatory variable we use the bank performance, along
with the ownership form (Dependent Banks, Independent Commercial Banks and
Savings Banks), the size of the bank and the time period dummies. To test for the
presence of differences for different types of ownership, we use dummy variables for
each form of ownership that interact with the explanatory variables. The variable
 1D takes the value one for the case of subsidiaries and zero otherwise, while  2D is
used for Savings Banks and adopts the value one only for that type of bank. Thus, we
use the following model,
it
ii
i
DummiesTimeDD
DDDD
εγββ
ββαα
ββα
++++
++++
++=
 SizeSize
 ePerformancePerformanc                
SizeePerformanconInterventi Governance
i222i121
i212i1112211
i2i10
To estimate this model, we exclude the variable “no governance intervention” from the
dependent variable categories, and the ownership type “Independent Commercial
Banks” from the explanatory variables. Using this notation, we can rewrite our initial
hypotheses as follows,
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H1.  0111111 >⇔>+ ββββ
H2. a) 0121121 >⇔>+ ββββ
These hypotheses earlier formulated imply that we expect a negative sign for the
coefficient  1β (that is, a better performance means a lower likelihood of intervention).
But we also expect that the coefficient of the multiplicative variable
 ownership of form  eperformanc i×  be positive, which means that we expect a weaker
relationship between a bad performance and governance intervention for the case of
Dependent Banks and Savings Banks, than in the case of Independent Commercial
Banks (the omitted variable). Therefore, we expect 1111 βββ >+ , or a positive
coefficient, 0 11 >β , for the case of Dependent Banks. Similarly, we expect
1121 βββ >+ , or a positive coefficient, 0 12 >β , for the Savings Banks case. This
applies to the different mechanisms with the exception of merger/acquisitions and the
Savings Banks. According to H2b, mergers are expected to be the main governance
intervention for Savings Banks. No further hypothesis is formulated for the control
variable size. 
Table 4 shows the results of the multinomial logit model. Overall, the statistical fit of
the model is good, as the log-likelihood statistics indicate. For Savings Banks, the
positive intercept values in the replacement of the chairman and in the Merger variables
confirm that, after controlling for size and performance, those two mechanisms are more
frequently used among Savings Banks than within Independent Commercial Banks.
However, the negative coefficient for Savings Banks in the column of CEO replacement
confirms that general managers change less frequently in Savings Banks, after
controlling for size and performance. Being a Dependent Bank only affects the
likelihood of chairman removal (it goes up) with respect to what happens for the
Independent banks, controlling for size and performance level. Also for the group of
Dependent Banks, we obtain that the variable size increases the likelihood of board
change and CEO removal. Concerning ownership forms, the likelihood of a governance
intervention seems to be independent of the size of the bank, except for the case of
Independent Banks and mergers where a positive and statistically significant coefficient
is obtained.
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Among Independent Banks, governance intervention is always negatively associated
with economic performance, with the exception of changes in the board. This result can
be seen from the negative and statistically significant coefficients of the variables
ROAt-1 and IOAt-1 in the last three columns of table 4.
Table 4. Multinomial Logit.
Types of governance intervention for Independent Banks, Dependent Banks and Savings Banks.
Omitted dependent variable: No control. Omitted ownership form: Independent Banks.
 Board turnover Chairman removal CEO replacement Merger / acquisition
Intercept
-3.067***
(0.64)
-3.369***
(0.687)
-2.589***
(0.509)
-2.888***
(0.525)
-0.936***
(0.292)
-0.653**
(0.296)
-24.692***
(0.784)
-24.782***
(0.821)
Dependent banks
-0.386
(0.5)
-0.162
(0.494)
0.422
(0.431)
0.755*
(0.429)
0.084
(0.204)
-0.052
(0.193)
-0.372
(0.494)
0.09
(0.464)
Savings banks
-0.006
(0.472)
0.441
(0.518)
0.907**
(0.434)
1.575***
(0.445)
-1.424***
(0.267)
-1.602***
(0.338)
0.704
(0.561)
1.18**
(0.473)
Size (total assets) (t-1)
-0.012
(0.03)
-0.011
(0.029)
-0.032
(0.043)
-0.029
(0.042)
0.004
(0.008)
0.005
(0.008)
0.021
(0.014)
0.024*
(0.014)
Size x Dependent
banks
0.371**
(0.172)
0.355**
(0.173)
0.128
(0.152)
0.137
(0.151)
0.167**
(0.085)
0.173**
(0.084)
0.23
(0.181)
0.23
(0.18)
Size x Savings
banks
0.011
(0.042)
0.016
(0.04)
-0.051
(0.062)
-0.057
(0.063)
0.025
(0.016)
0.026
(0.016)
-0.113
(0.083)
-0.128
(0.085)
ROA(t-1)
-0.042
(0.157)
-0.68**
(0.267)
-0.017
(0.06)
-0.73**
(0.302)
ROA(t-1)x Dependent
banks
0.102
(0.159)
0.666**
(0.27)
-0.035
(0.067)
0.634**
(0.311)
ROA(t-1) x Savings
Banks
0.304
(0.196)
0.848***
(0.291)
0.118
(0.124)
0.28
(0.435)
IOA(t-1)
0.109
(0.162)
-0.461***
(0.156)
-0.27***
(0.093)
-0.539***
(0.175)
IOA(t-1) x Dependent
banks
-0.05
(0.166)
0.478***
(0.16)
0.206**
(0.099)
0.459**
(0.193)
IOA(t-1) x Savings
banks
-0.051
(0.328)
0.406*
(0.244)
0.466*
(0.268)
0
(0.328)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -1768.70 -1767.2***
LR chi2 -1768.70 321.09***
Standard errors are reported inside the parentheses.
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
In general, the coefficient of IOAt-1 has a higher statistical significance than the ROAt-1
coefficient, and for the case of CEO removal the former is the only statistically
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significant coefficient. In that sense, the profit measure which is harder to “smooth” by
the management of the bank, appears to be more informative about the economic
performance of the bank. We report the coefficients for the two performance variables,
but we will comment now only on the IOA results. First, we see that for the
Independent Commercial Banks governance intervention is negatively associated with
economic performance, as good governance practices would predict.
Furthermore, the variable   Banks Dependent eperformanc i× presents a positive
coefficient, and in absolute terms the value of such coefficient is similar to the one
estimated above for the performance variable. By construction, the relevant coefficient
for the sample of Dependent Banks is the sum of those two coefficients, 111 ββ + , which
means that for the Dependent Banks in our sample, governance intervention is not
associated with economic performance. This result is consistent with our first
hypothesis H1 and confirms that subsidiaries are more likely to be subject to
“behavioral control” rather than to “performance control”.
For the sample of Savings Banks, the coefficient of  Banks Savings  eperformanc i× is
also positive and statistically significant, except when the governance intervention is
merger/acquisition where the coefficient is not statistically significant. On one hand,
this means that, among Savings Banks, the replacement of the chairman or the CEO are
not associated to economic performance of the bank. On the other hand, poor economic
performance may activate more likely a merger or acquisition as a disciplinary device.
This evidence corroborates that mergers become the main governance mechanism to fix
economic inefficiencies in the case of Savings Banks and, in that way, it confirms our
hypothesis H2b.
6. Conclusion
This paper examines the effectiveness of several governance mechanisms in the Spanish
banking sector. Although we acknowledge that market-based mechanisms, such as
takeovers and product market competition, can work for the banking sector in the same
fashion as for other sectors of the economy, we find that, in practice, these mechanisms
may be weaker in the banking sector. The reason is that the presence of regulatory
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intervention limits the effectiveness of the take-over market and the intensity of rivalry,
due to certain requirements concerning ownership of banks and the opening of new
banks within a market. An empirical question emerges from this situation: to check if
internal governance mechanisms and regulatory intervention are effective enough to
correct for corporate control problems and to compensate, at the same time, the
limitations of market-based mechanisms.
Our analysis considers three forms of ownership, Independent Commercial Banks,
Dependent Banks and Savings Banks, along with four control mechanisms, changes in
the board, removal of the Chairman, removal of the CEO and mergers/acquisitions. One
important research question is to compare the different levels of governance
effectiveness between Savings Banks and Commercial Banks, given the special
ownership and governance structure of the former.
Our results show that governance interventions in the Spanish banking industry occur
with a frequency rate comparable to the ones observed in other countries, such as Japan
or the US, where similar data are available. The exception comes from the
merger/acquisition mechanism, much less frequent in Spain than in the US. At the same
time, we find that each governance mechanism is used with different intensity by the
different types of banks. For example, chairman turnover and mergers are more
frequently used among Savings Banks, while CEO replacement is more frequent in the
Independent Commercial Banks than in the Savings Banks. 
This paper also corroborates the general hypothesis that governance intervention is
more likely when firms are poorly managed and their economic returns are low. The
evidence becomes stronger for the sample of Independent Commercial Banks when
performance is measured in terms of profits from normal banking operations. This was
an expected result since these banks fit closely with the ownership type of a
shareholder-owned firm with a separation between ownership and control. On the other
hand, Subsidiaries of other banks behave more as internal divisions of a larger
company, and their control becomes more “behavioral” than ”performance-based”.
For the case of Savings Banks, this negative association between governance control
and economic performance can be only observed for the case of Mergers. The unique
governance structure of Spanish Savings banks, where several stakeholder groups are
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represented in the General Assembly and in the Board of Directors, does not seem very
effective at the time of disciplining executive directors and top managers when the
economic performance becomes low. This would confirm the presumption that
managers and workers of the Savings Banks, the so-called insiders, hold power within
these organizations. Or, from a different perspective, that the internal governance
system of the Savings Banks with stakeholders that are likely to hold different interests
and information, is rather weak. Nevertheless, a poor economic performance may be
corrected through Mergers (and possibly through regulatory interventions, although we
lack the necessary data about this) and this correction appears to be quite effective
since, at the end, the average economic performance of Savings Banks is better than that
of the Commercial Banks. This evidence seems to suggest that, at least in Spain,
competition in retail banking remains high besides regulatory intervention. Banks that
make wrong decisions and/or manage in an inefficient way their resources will obtain
lower economic returns and, at some point, they will disappear as a result of a merger or
acquisition. This will happen independently of the ownership structure of the bank.
So far, mergers among Spanish Savings Banks have been only possible when those
Savings Banks involved belonged to the same region (State or “Comunidad
Autónoma”). If mergers must continue to be an effective disciplinary device, it seems
necessary to modify the current regulatory restrictions that make mergers between
Savings Banks located in different regions almost impossible. Since mergers are an
effective disciplinary mechanisms also for Independent Commercial Banks, the
recommendation to remove the obstacles to interstate mergers applies not only to states
or autonomous regions within a country, but also to international mergers across the
European Union. 
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